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Dignity, Intersectional Gendered Harm, and a
Flexible Approach: Analysis of the Right to One’s
Image in Quebec
Yuan Stevens*

INTRODUCTION
Canada is one of many countries that has recently enacted laws to address
the risk of an emerging instance of harm — the sharing of one’s image without
their consent on the internet.1 This harm can happen at alarming speeds and on a
massive scale in terms of exposure.2 In tandem, there is a growing body of
scholarly work in English on the dignity-focused aspects of the civil tradition,
particularly in Canada, which has dealt with this phenomenon for multiple
decades.3 More specifically, dating back to the 1970s, Quebec has recognized the
right to one’s image (droit à l’image), 4 which is the closest civil law
*
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Yuan Stevens (she/they) is an LL.M Candidate with a concentration in law and
technology at the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law. The author wishes to thank the
Association du Jeune Barreau de Montréal for the opportunity to present findings from
this work, as well as Suzie Dunn, Jane Bailey, and an anonymous reviewer for their very
helpful feedback on earlier versions of this article.
Clare McGlynn, Erika Rackley, Ruth Houghton, ‘‘Beyond ‘Revenge Porn’: The
Continuum of Image-Based Sexual Abuse” (2017) 25:1 Fem Leg Stud 25 at 25. At the
time of writing, the Government of Canada has also issued a technical paper and
discussion guide outlining a proposal for legislation that would hold ‘‘online communication services” and ‘‘online communication service providers” legally responsible for
five types of online content, including the non-consensual distribution of intimate images
online. See Government of Canada, ‘‘Have your say: The Government’s proposed
approach to address harmful content online” (29 July 2021), online: <www.canada.ca/
en/canadian-heritage/campaigns/harmful-online-content.html>.
Cynthia Khoo, ‘‘Deplatforming Misogyny: Report on Platform Liability for Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence” (2021) Women’s Legal Action Fund Report at
62-70; Jane Bailey & Jasmine Dong, ‘‘Toward Survivor-Centred Outcomes for Targets
of Privacy-Invasive TFVA: Assessing the Equality-Affirming Impact of Jarvis” in
Christopher Hunt & Robert Diab, eds, The Last Frontier: Digital Privacy and the
Charter, (Thomson Reuters Press) [forthcoming].
See e.g. Suzie Dunn, “Identity Manipulation: Responding to Advances in Artificial
Intelligence and Robotics” (Paper delivered at We Robot 2020, Ottawa, 2 April 2020) at
10 [unpublished]; Andrea Slane, ‘‘From Scanning to Sexting: The Scope of Protection of
Dignity-Based Privacy in Canadian Child Pornography Law” (2010) 48:3/4 Osgoode
Hall LJ 543; Lisa Austin, ‘‘Privacy and Private Law: The Dilemma of Justification”,
(2010) 55:2 McGill LJ 165; Pamela Hrick, ‘‘The Potential of Centralized and StatutorilyEmpowered Bodies to Advance a Survivor-Centred Approach to Technology-Facilitated Violence Against Women” in Jane Bailey, Asher Flynn & Nicola Henry, eds,
Emerald International Handbook of Technology-Facilitated Violence and Abuse (UK:
Emerald, 2021).
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approximation of private liability based on invasion of privacy or publicity
rights. As explained further below, while the conception of privacy in North
American common law is generally rooted in the value of freedom from
interference by government or other people and has evolved in a piecemeal
fashion,5 the right to one’s image in Quebec is a legal framework emanating from
the continental European tradition that has historically been focused on
prioritizing one’s right to self-determination as a corollary to dignity in the
context of community.6
This article draws on critical feminist theory7 and the framework of
intersectionality8 to examine how courts in Quebec have begun — and are poised
— to respond to the phenomenon of the non-consensual sharing of images,
particularly if they are of an intimate or sexual nature. Dunn’s work has
demonstrated that Quebec’s dignity-focused approach to the protection of
identity and privacy ought to guide the development of similar civil recourse
provided in common law Canada.9 This paper fills a gap by identifying the
affordances and gaps of Quebec’s legal approach from the vantage point of
equality-seeking groups, with a particular focus on the gendered dimensions of
this harm. Notably, analysis has been limited to ten legal decisions from the
Quebec jurisdiction that met certain inclusion and exclusion criteria as outlined
below.
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Pierre Trudel, “Le droit de la personne sur son image” in Vincent Gautrais, Catherine
Régis & Laurence Largenté, eds, Me´langes en l’honneur du professeur Patrick A. Molinari
(Montréal: Éditions Thémis, 2018) at 353.
Giorgio Resta, ‘‘Personnalité, Persönlichkeit, Personality” (2008) 1:3 Eur J Comparative
L & Governance 215; Jane Bailey, “Towards an Equality-Enhancing Conception of
Privacy” (2008) 31:2 Dal LJ 267 at 273; Karen Eltis, ‘‘Can the Reasonable Person Still Be
‘Highly Offended’? An Invitation to Consider the Civil Law Tradition’s Personality
Rights-Based Approach to Tort Privacy” (2008) 5:1/2 U Ottawa L & Technology J 199 at
205 [Eltis, “Can the Reasonable Person Still Be ’Highly Offended’?”]; Karen Eltis, ”Is
’Truthtelling’ Decontextualized Online Still Reasonable? Restoring Context to Defamation Analysis in the Digital Age“ (2018) 63 McGill LJ 553 [Eltis, ‘‘Is ’Truthtelling’
Decontextualized Online Still Reasonable?”].
James Q Whitman, “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty”
(2004) 113:6 Yale LJ 1151; Resta, ibid; Elisabeth Logeais & Jean-Baptiste Schroeder,
‘‘The French Right of Image: An Ambiguous Concept Protecting the Human Persona”
(1998) 18:3 Loy LA Ent L Rev 511; Eltis, ‘‘Is ‘Truthtelling’ Decontextualized Online Still
Reasonable?”, ibid.
See e.g. Moira Aikenhead, ‘‘A ’Reasonable’ Expectation of Sexual Privacy in the Digital
Age” (2018) 41:2 Dal LJ 273.
See e.g. Kimberlé Crenshaw, ‘‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence against Women of Color” (1991) 43:6 Stanford LJ 1241; Alexa Dodge,
‘‘Trading Nudes Like Hockey Cards: Exploring the Diversity of ‘Revenge Porn’ Cases
Responded to in Law” (2021) 30:3 Soc & Leg Stud 448 [Dodge, “Trading Nudes Like
Hockey Cards”].
Dunn, supra note 3.
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In the Canadian context, the landmark Supreme Court case of Aubry c.
Éditions Vice Versa Inc. recognized in 1998 that the right to one’s image in
Quebec is an aspect of the right to one’s private life and personality rights, which
are protected in both the Quebec Charter and the Civil Code of Quebec.10 Below,
I briefly outline the sources of law that set out the right to one’s image in Canada
and Quebec, solidifying that the civil tradition in Quebec’s private law prioritizes
the protection of dignity in privacy infringement claims involving images. I also
analyze several image rights cases that fall within specific parameters to show
that judges in Quebec do not consistently understand the sharing of women’s
images as a matter of gender-based violence.11 In line with work by Aikenhead
focused on Canada’s criminal response to NCDII (non-consensual disclosure of
intimate images), my findings also reveal that judges in Quebec at times
incorporate stereotypical biases regarding the responsibilization of complainants
when analyzing invasion of privacy claims.12
A dignity-based approach is one important condition enabling judges to
analyze the gender-based violence that describes the use of images — particularly
ones of a sexual nature — featuring equality-seeking groups without their
consent.13 This article is significant for the way it demonstrates that a dignitybased approach is clearly not necessarily enough to incentivize judges in Quebec
to consider the larger societal issues at play when analyzing the right to one’s
image as an aspect of privacy or one’s private life.
However, the final prong of my analysis begins to demonstrate that the legal
notion of the right to one’s image in Quebec also holds promise for being broader
in scope, and for being able to capture a wider range of unwanted activity
regarding the use of one’s image. This article focuses on the gender-based aspects
of the non-consensual taking and sharing of images. Yet, as we shall we, many of
the complainants vying to win their invasion of privacy case in Quebec court
were not only women; in many cases they were also racialized, were often
religious minorities, and, in one case, the complainant was a trans woman.
Quebec’s dignity-based approach to civil privacy claims — in contrast to the
piecemeal approach that defines the rest of Canada’s colonial, common law
system regarding civil privacy claims over sexual images 14 — is therefore likely
better equipped to respond to a wider range of circumstances involving rights in
the use of one’s image and likeness for the benefit of numerous equality-seeking
communities, such the LGBTQ2S+ community, religious minorities, and
racialized people.
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Aubry c. Éditions Vice Versa Inc., 1998 CarswellQue 4806, 1998 CarswellQue 4807, (sub
nom. Aubry v. Éditions Vice-Versa inc.) [1998] 1 S.C.R. 591 (S.C.C.) [Aubry].
Bailey & Dong, supra note 2.
Aikenhead, supra note 7.
Ibid.; Bailey, supra note 5; Slane, supra note 3.
McGlynn et al, supra note 1 at 28.
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1. THE CONTEXT
The law in Canada has rapidly evolved in the last decade to account for the
era of online, user-generated content. Dubbed the ‘‘web 2.0” by tech consultants
in by-gone times,15 ours is an era where it is easier than ever to record, publish,
alter, and share media such as written texts, images, videos, games, or any other
form of experience or content online.16 The democratization of content creation
has also extended and enabled new forms of harm, exacerbating previously
existing systemic inequalities between different groups of people. Scholars
McGlynn et al, responding to the onslaught of laws enacted around the world
seeking to combat some notion of ‘‘revenge porn,”17 importantly relabelled the
issue as a matter of ‘‘image-based sexual abuse.”18 Use of this term is intentional:
it captures a wide array of practices that have as a common denominator the
harassment and abuse predominantly against women and girls,19 with examples
including the use of images without consent (e.g., sharing, editing, etc.),
extortion, stalking or voyeurism online, and rape or death threats, among many
other emergent types of harm.20
Women are, indeed, disproportionately targeted and affected by these
behaviours, and there are other variables that also warrant consideration. Writing to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women, researchers at the Citizen Lab observed that
‘‘[d]iscrimination on the basis of gender identity, gender expression,
sexual orientation, disability, race, ethnicity, Indigenous status, age,
religion and other factors also compound, exacerbate and complicate
experiences of gender-based violence.”21

More specifically, they also pointed to a breadth of reports demonstrating
that Indigenous women, people of colour, those with precarious immigration
statuses, and sex workers face additional barriers when seeking legal protection
against online violence, abuse, and harassment. 22 Work by Khoo serves as an
15

16

17

18
19
20
21

Lev Grossman, ‘‘You — Yes, You — Are TIME’s Person of the Year,” Time (25
December 2006), online: <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,1570810,00.html>.
Nicola Henry et al, Image-Based Sexual Abuse: A Study on the Causes and Consequences
of Non-Consensual Nude or Sexual Imagery (New York: Routledge, 2021) at 2.
See e.g. Yuan Stevens, ‘‘‘Revenge Porn,’ Tort Law, and Changing Socio-Technological
Realities: A Commentary on Doe 464533 v ND” (2017) 15 CJLT 337.
McGlynn et al, supra note 1.
Ibid. at 40; Henry et al, supra note 16.
McGlynn et al, supra note 1 at 36, 28.
Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs, ‘‘Submission of the Citizen Lab (Munk
School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto) to the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences, Ms. Dubravka
Simonovic” (2 November 2017) at 2, online (pdf): University of Toronto <citizenlab.ca/
wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Final-UNSRVAG-CitizenLab.pdf> [perma.cc/UH9R39EL].
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important reminder that analysis of technology-facilitated gender-based violence
necessarily includes trans women, trans men, as well as nonbinary individuals,
given that such activity ‘‘is rooted in, arises from, and is exacerbated by
misogyny, sexist norms, and rape culture” as examples of the systemic oppression
that has long occurred against these communities both before and since the
inception of the internet.23
The tragic suicides in the early 2010s of two Canadian teenagers, Rehtaeh
Parsons and Amanda Todd, can be seen as the lynchpins leading politicians and
lawmakers to take seriously the issue of image-based (sexual) abuse in Canada. 24
Common to the story of both teens is the experience of having their images
captured — while nude or engaging in sexual activity — in the context of the
coercion and intimidation by boys or men, leading to tragic and lasting harm on
them as individuals and on their communities writ small and large. There had
been previous high-profile cases of image-based harassment and violence online
involving Canadian teenagers, but the “intense media coverage and public outcry
in response to Todd’s and Parsons’ suicide” spurred the enactment of numerous
legal initiatives at the provincial and federal levels in Canada starting in 2013. 25
Currently, numerous provinces (Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, Alberta,
Manitoba, and Prince Edward Island) have enacted statutory tort law that
specifically seeks to address the “non-consensual distribution of intimate
images.”26 British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Newfoundland
have also had statutory invasion of privacy torts at their disposal for several
years,27 and Saskatchewan amended its privacy law to explicitly account for
NCDII in 2018.28 Numerous other statutory bases exist for certain privacy
violation cases,29 as well as related common law torts, including defamation,
invasion of privacy,30 breach of confidence, and intentional infliction of mental
22
23
24
25

26

27

28

29

Ibid.
Khoo, supra note 2.
Carissima Mathen, ‘‘Crowdsourcing Sexual Objectification” (2014) 3:3 Laws 529.
Mylynn Felt, ‘‘The Incessant Image: How Dominant News Coverage Shaped Canadian
Cyberbullying Law” (2015) 66 UNBLJ 137 at 145.
Intimate Images and Cyber-protection Act, SNS 2017, c 7 (NS); The Intimate Image
Protection Act, CCSM, c I87 (MB); Intimate Image Protection Act, SNL 2018, c I-22
(NL); Protecting Victims of Non-consensual Distribution of Intimate Images Act, RSA
2017, c P-26.9 (AB); Intimate Images Protection Act, RSPEI 1988, c I-9.1 (PEI). Notably,
this list of pieces of legislation does not include changes to provincial education law
responding to cyberbullying; see e.g. Felt, ibid.
Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373 (BC); Privacy Act, RSS 1978, c P-24 (SK); Privacy Act,
CCSM c P125 (MB); Privacy Act, RSNL 1990, c P-22 (NL).
Privacy Act, RSS 1978, c P-24, ss 7-8; Government of Saskatchewan, ‘‘Legislation To
Support Victims Of ‘Revenge Porn’ Takes Effect” (17 September 2018), online:
<https://www.saskatchewan.ca/government/news-and-media/2018/september/17/
privacy-act>
Barbara von Tigerstrom, ‘‘Direct and Vicarious Liability for Tort Claims Involving
Violation of Privacy” (2018) 96:3 Can Bar Rev 539 at 542.
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distress,31 the analysis of which is out of scope for this article. There is currently
little case law involving interpretation of Saskatchewan’s amended privacy law,
though at the time of writing two sets of cases have involved substantive
application and examination of Nova Scotia’s32 and Manitoba’s NCDII laws.33
At the federal level, s 162.1 of the Criminal Code came into force in 2015,
making it a crime to share a person’s intimate image without their consent. 34
When s 162.1 was enacted, Aikenhead feared that judges would fail to interpret
NCDII as gender-based violence.35 Building on her work assisting the Women’s
Legal Action Fund’s intervention in the landmark decision of R. v. Jarvis,
Aikenhead demonstrated the critical need to recognize the harms of NCDII as
gendered in nature and premised on the objectification of women; she also
admonished judges to ensure that conceptions of an ‘‘ideal” victim do not impact
their interpretations of (a) whether NCDII has occurred, (b) the seriousness of
NCDII, or (c) victims’ privacy expectations.36 Along with work by Dunn on
dignity,37 Aikenhead’s work served as a foundational piece in this article’s
analysis, and will be referred to in depth below.
Recent work by Dueck-Read also sought to respond directly to Aikenhead’s
calls to the judiciary. Writing in 2020, Dueck-Read analyzed a random selection
of the now several dozen criminal cases that cite s 162.1.38 This important work,
though necessarily and intentionally limited in its scope, concluded that judges
are thankfully not consistently perpetuating rape myths and discriminatory
stereotypes common to sexual assault when they analyze s 162.1.39
Further analysis of the factual situations that could be captured by s 162.1
demonstrates that there is a wide range of circumstances that fall out of the
‘‘paradigmatic scenario of a man distributing intimate images to harass or abuse
his female partner/ex-partner,” highlighting the need for increased research with

30
31

32
33

34
35
36

37
38

39

Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32, 2012 CarswellOnt 274 (Ont. C.A.).
Suzie Dunn & Alessia Petricone-Westwood, ‘‘More than ‘Revenge Porn’: Civil
Remedies for the Nonconsensual Distribution of Intimate Images“ (Paper delivered at
the 38th Annual Civil Litigation Conference, Mont-Tremblant, November 2018).
Feser v. Candelora, 2021 NSCA 49, 2021 CarswellNS 430 (N.S. C.A.)
Doucet v. The Royal Winnipeg Ballet (The Royal Winnipeg Ballet School), 2019 ONSC
6982, 2019 CarswellOnt 19977 (Ont. S.C.J.).
Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act, SC 2014, c 31.
Aikenhead, supra note 7.
Ibid. at 275; R. v. Jarvis, 2019 SCC 10, 2019 CarswellOnt 1921, 2019 CarswellOnt 1922
(S.C.C.).
Dunn, supra note 3.
Alicia Dueck-Read, ‘‘Judicial Constructions of Responsibility in Revenge Porn: Judicial
Discourse in Non-Consensual Intimate Image Distribution Cases — A Feminist
Analysis” (2020) 43:3 Man LJ 357.
Ibid.; Alexa Dodge, ‘‘Digitizing Rape Culture: Online Sexual Violence and the Power of
the Digital Photograph” (2016) 12:1 Crime, Media, Culture 65.
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an intersectional lens looking at the multiple, overlapping aspects of identity that
may also fall outside the confines of cis, heterosexual and/or white woman. 40
It is clear that scholars have made concerted and important efforts to
examine Canada’s criminal law and common law response to the use of a
person’s sexual image without their consent. Yet along with Dunn, I seek to
contribute to the growing body of literature examining the legal concepts that
exist particularly in Canada’s civil law tradition rooted in French colonization of
Quebec and that may be relied on to protect one’s image rights and right to selfdetermination.41 Much like Dueck-Read, I position this article in direct
conversation not only with Aikenhead but also with Dunn, who have both
advocated for a dignity-based approach to judicial examinations of invasion of
privacy claims in Canada involving one’s image. Beyond the specific focus of
image-based rights, Quebec authors such as Karen Eltis have contributed
significantly to the argument that Quebec’s dignity-based approach is best
equipped to address the harms caused in the digital age.42 Indeed, as described in
further depth below, the protection of privacy in Quebec shows significant
promise for those in pursuit of dignity-based analyses of the use of a person’s
image without consent and particularly for equity-seeking communities. The
notion of the right to one’s image in Quebec stands in contrast to the libertybased and piecemeal approach to privacy protection that emerged in North
America’s common law;43 Quebec’s law over images has been developed to
explicitly reproduce the rights to one’s private life and to personality (rooted in
continental Europe) as aspects of individual dignity and collective human
flourishing.44
In short, a dignity-based approach to non-criminal invasion of privacy
claims for image-based (sexual) abuse already explicitly exists in Canada, albeit
in the francophone civil law tradition. This article fills a critical gap in research
by further examining the mechanics of the right to one’s image in Quebec,
analyzing whether judges adequately recognize such related harms as genderbased violence when adjudicating the right to image cases, and assessing the
strengths of Quebec’s flexible system in comparison to the relatively stringent
and narrow approach of Canada’s common law tradition when it comes to
equality-seeking communities.

40
41
42
43

44

Dodge, ‘‘Trading Nudes Like Hockey Cards,” supra note 8 at 2, 4, 14.
Dunn, supra note 3.
“Can the Reasonable Person Still Be ’Highly Offended’?”, supra note 5.
Slane, supra note 3; Austin, supra note 3; Avner Levin & Mary Jo Nicholson, ‘‘Privacy
Law in the United States, the EU and Canada: The Allure of the Middle Ground” (2005)
2:2 U Ottawa L & Technology J 357.
Whitman, supra note 6; McGlynn et al, supra note 1; Resta, supra note 5.
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2. THE RIGHT TO ONE’S IMAGE IN QUEBEC
In Quebec, a legal concept exists that finds no exact equivalent in the
common law tradition that marks the rest of colonial North America: personality
rights, rooted in a concept of dignity.45 The term ‘‘personality rights” in the civil
tradition can generally be distinguished from the notions of publicity rights or
the tort of misappropriation of personality, both of which exist in the rest of
Canada’s common law tradition and have come to focus on the proprietary or
economic interests one has in their image or identity.46 Instead, perhaps the
closest approximation to the notion of personality rights in the common law
tradition is the legal concept of the right to privacy, which “works as the main
tool for the conceptualization of dignitary interests both in the law of torts and in
constitutional law.”47
The tort-based privacy actions found in Canada’s common law tradition
have an interrelated, yet separate, history (and trajectory) from the right to one’s
image that exists in Quebec’s civil law tradition. Without being exhaustive, work
by Dunn,48 Eltis,49 Levin and Nicholson,50 Potvin,51 Rigaux,52 Siegel et al,53
Slane,54 Trudel,55 as well as Whitman56 all shine a light on the key differences
between these two legal modes of operating and the values that animate them.
For the purposes of this article, a key underlying difference between the two legal
traditions generally involves the fact that ‘‘common law has taken privacy as a
starting point, and this has historically been based on the idea of (negative)
liberty,” whereas ‘‘the cornerstone of the civil law model has been personality,
which was originally bound up with the notion of dignity.” 57
Through case law’s interpretation of codified civil law, the legal tradition in
Quebec has evolved over the course of decades to protect privacy rights
45
46
47
48
49

50
51

52

53

54
55
56
57

Eltis, ‘‘Can the Reasonable Person Still Be ’Highly Offended’?“, supra note 5.
Dunn, supra note 3 at 30, 34.
Resta, supra note 5 at 222.
Dunn, supra note 3.
See e.g. Eltis, “Can the Reasonable Person Still Be ‘Highly Offended’?”, supra note 5;
Eltis, ‘‘Is ’Truthtelling’ Decontextualized Online Still Reasonable?”, supra note 6.
Levin & Nicholson, supra note 43.
Louise Potvin, La personne et la protection de son image : e´tude compare´e des droits
québe´cois, français et de la common law anglaise (Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais,
1991).
François Rigaux, La protection de la vie prive´e et des autres biens de la personnalite´
(Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1990).
Ariane Siegel et al, “Survey of Privacy Law Developments in 2009: United States,
Canada, and the European Union” (2009) 65:1 Bus Lawyer 285.
Slane, supra note 3.
Trudel, supra note 4.
Whitman, supra note 6.
Resta, supra note 5 at 241.
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associated with one’s image.58 The core pieces of legislation governing private
affairs in Quebec are the Civil Code of Quebec59 (the Civil Code) and the Quebec
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms (Quebec’s Charter),60 typically cited in
tandem with each other as invoked by the complainant. Importantly, unlike
Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms as part of the Constitution,61 the
Quebec Charter is enforceable against all people (and not just the state).62 In
common law Canada, one might turn to a right of action under statute or a
common law tort in the case of defamation or the non-consensual sharing of
images.63 However, in Quebec, one’s extra-contractual right of action in such a
case is found within both the Civil Code and Quebec’s Charter.
As hinted at earlier, Quebec’s Charter is rooted in a dignity-based approach
to the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms. 64 It protects
fundamental freedoms such as the right to freedom of expression (s 3),65 the
positive rights to the safeguard of one’s dignity, honour, and reputation (s 4) 66 as
well as respect for one’s private life (s. 5), 67 the ‘‘full and equal recognition and
exercise of [one’s] human rights and freedoms, without distinction, exclusion or
preference” (s. 10),68 and the right to cessation from interference with such rights
as well as compensation for moral or material prejudice resulting from such
interference (s 49).69 None of these rights are absolute. Limits to these rights can
be fixed by law, and these fundamental freedoms must be exercised with ‘‘a
proper regard for democratic values, public order, and the general well-being of
citizens in Quebec.”70
At the outset of the Civil Code, all people are granted the right to their
‘‘name, reputation and privacy” as a fundamental aspect of their ‘‘personality
rights” (s 3).71 The right to privacy under the Civil Code is also enshrined in ss 35
58

59
60

61

62
63

64
65
66
67
68
69
70

See e.g. Potvin, supra note 51 at 214, who observes that case law dating back to at least
1969 recognized the principle of human rights over one’s image and likeness.
Civil Code of Quebec, CQLR c CCQ-1991, [Civil Code or CCQ].
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, CQLR c C-12, [Quebec Charter or Quebec’s
Charter].
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
Quebec Charter, supra note 60, s 49.
See also Barbara von Tigerstrom, Information and Privacy Law in Canada (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2020) at 137 [von Tigerstrom, Information and Privacy Law].
CCQ, supra note 59.
Quebec Charter, supra note 60, s 3.
Ibid., s 4.
Ibid., s 5.
Ibid., s 10.
Ibid., s 49.
Quebec Charter, supra note 60, s 9.1. See also von Tigerstrom, Information and Privacy
Law, supra note 63 at 134.
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to 41 of the law, with s 35 safeguarding the right to respect of one’s ‘‘reputation
and privacy,” while using a person’s ‘‘name, image, likeness or voice” is one act
among others that may be considered the invasion of privacy of a person. 72
These Civil Code provisions came into effect 1994 and were enacted with the
explicit purpose of being in harmony with Quebec’s Charter. 73 The Civil Code
has also recreated a similar general tort liability found in the French Civil Code,
which imposes a duty not to cause injury to others and can be relied on to hold
someone liable for bodily, moral, or material damages owed to another person. 74
The Supreme Court confirmed in the 1998 Aubry decision what courts in
Quebec had flirted with by that point for some time; namely, that the right to
one’s image indeed exists in Quebec and is an aspect of the right to one’s private
life as well as an aspect of one’s personality rights.75 According to Trudel, a right
in one’s image is also a quasi-patrimonial right,76 drawing on the French legal
tradition in which one is afforded the positive right to economically benefit from
one’s image.77 This helps to explain why a person of a certain level of notoriety in
the French and Québécois legal traditions has historically enjoyed the exclusive
right to use their image for advertising or commercial purposes, 78 in light of the
need to balance this right with the right to freedom of expression. 79 Work by
Eltis also demonstrates that privacy rights are inalienable and that intrusions of
privacy are ‘‘faults,” with the result that the damage they cause is actionable
whether or not the harm occurred in a private setting or in the context of
providing tacit consent.80 A violation of privacy can be found in Quebec even if
the image is not reprehensible, given that privacy and reputation are distinct (yet

71
72
73

74
75
76

77
78
79
80

CCQ, supra note 59, s 3.
Ibid., ss 35-41.
Adrian Popovici, ‘‘L’altération de la personnalité aux yeux du public” (1995) 28:1 La
Revue juridique Thémis. Prior to this point, there was no provision or set of provisions in
Quebec that proclaimed the existence of the right to respect for one’s private life; H
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famille et successions (Editions Yvon-Blais, 2005-06) at 59-77 on the inalienable nature of
such rights as privacy. See also Aubry, supra note 10.

ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO ONE’S IMAGE IN QUEBEC

317

interrelated) rights.81 The civilian approach to privacy is therefore flexible to
various environments and is adaptable to technological developments.82
Interestingly, courts in Quebec have also long turned to the tort of
defamation for certain cases involving the right to one’s image or likeness,
despite it being a creature of the common law.83 Notably, s 954 of the Code of
Civil Procedure in Quebec has historically prevented small claims courts from
hearing defamation claims,84 thus only some of the cases analyzed in this article
involve defamation; all are nonetheless rooted in assessments of Quebec’s
Charter and the Civil Code.
The approach to image rights in Quebec is rooted, as mentioned, in the
importance of safeguarding dignity. The majority of the Supreme Court in Aubry
stated that the right to privacy includes the right to control one’s image. 85
However, the court also emphasized the view that at the heart of privacy is the
negative right to be free from coercion or constraint:
When the values at issue in a case must be balanced, it is important to
bear in mind that our law is characterized by recognition of interrelated
rights whose purpose is to strengthen the democratic ideal. Individual
freedom is at the heart of that ideal. Dickson J. (as he then was) stated
the following in this regard in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1
S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.), at pp. 336-37:
Freedom can primarily be characterized by the absence of coercion or
constraint. If a person is compelled by the state or the will of another to
a course of action or inaction which he would not otherwise have
chosen, he is not acting of his own volition and he cannot be said to be
truly free. One of the major purposes of the Charter is to protect, within
reason, from compulsion or restraint. Coercion includes not only . . .
blatant forms of compulsion . . . [but also] includes indirect forms of
control which determine or limit alternative courses of conduct
available to others.86

This emphasis potentially stands in contrast or in addition to the positive,
collective rights at the heart of the right to personality and one’s image in both
France and Germany, with the German iteration particularly ensuring individual
self-determination over one’s information as ‘‘as a means of facilitating human
flourishing and the progress of society,” where ‘‘fulfillment of one’s own
81
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personality could not be achieved simply by retreating into a sphere protected by
external interferences and enclosing an isolated individual (as implied by Warren
and Brandeis’ right to be let alone), but only by engaging in social activities.”87
I intentionally aim to echo here findings by Bailey and other scholars that the
concept of privacy ‘‘serves not just individual interests but also common, public
and collective purposes,”88 such as the social interest in nourishing relationships
or the production or advancement of substantive equality for equality-seeking
groups.89 I explain relevant aspects of the mechanics of judicial interpretation for
the right to one’s image below when necessary; however, the focus in this article
is on the discourse that is used (or not) by judges relating to protected grounds
under discrimination law such as gender, race, ethnicity, religion, and gender
identity as examples of such equality-seeking groups.

3. ANALYZING GENDER-BASED AND INTERSECTIONAL
VIOLENCE IN IMAGE RIGHTS CASES
Despite the dignity-based approach that undergirds determinations of the
right to one’s image, this limited study indicates that judges in Quebec only
sometimes acknowledge the collective, gendered aspects of the harm of violations
of privacy, particularly when the plaintiff has other aspects of identity that make
them more vulnerable to harm. At times, judges also perpetuate individualized
‘‘responsibilization narratives” that compare complainants to an ‘‘idealized
victim,”90 with counter-productive results in the face of the dignity-based right to
one’s image.

(a) Methods and Framework
This article involves analysis of 10 legal decisions in Quebec courts regarding
the right to one’s image in the context of an image being taken, used, and/or
shared without consent.91 I found these cases through a note-up search on
87
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Resta, supra note 5 at 234, 237-38.
Priscilla M Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values and Public Policy
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995) at 221, cited in Bailey, supra note
5.
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Quicklaw for cases in Quebec involving s 5 of Quebec’s Charter92 using the
search terms ‘‘publier,” ‘‘image,” and ‘‘vie privée.” These search parameters were
determined by the applicability of Quebec’s Charter to cases involving the nonconsensual sharing of images, as described above. These inclusion and exclusion
criteria were intentionally applied in order to limit the number of cases analyzed
to a reasonable amount and to draw on the use of eligibility criteria common to
qualitative studies used for such methods as systematic reviews, meta-analyses,
and ethnographic research, which facilitates accountability, transparency, and
reproducibility in the scholarly context.93
I engaged in textual analysis of all cases found using the search terms above
in order to include in my analysis only the cases with facts involving nonconsensual activity related to a person’s image (and not, for example, written text
about that person).94 I also included only those with a ‘‘positive” Quicklaw
signal, showing that the case analyzed is good law (meaning it has not received
merely neutral or cautionary treatment, and it has not been reversed), and
included the cases that had no known case history, indicating the case could be
interpreted by courts in various ways.95 I excluded administrative tribunal cases
and one case initiated by a minor who lacked capacity, a topic which is out of this
article’s scope.96 The original language for all decisions found is French, and all
quotations produced in this article are translations by the author into English.
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(b) The Gendered and Intersectional Nature of the Right to One’s Image
The ten cases analyzed for this article demonstrate that the right to one’s
image has important gendered dimensions; the facts of all cases involved
plaintiffs who were women.97 This is consistent with the fact that women’s bodies
are routinely subject to the objectification of their likeness in the form of images,
with objectification defined broadly here as ‘‘when one person uses another
without taking into account, or ignoring or being indifferent to, that person’s
desires.”98
In the case of Aubry, the photographer, a man, took and published a photo
of a teenage girl without her permission.99 In N.G. c. F.B., a vengeful male exlover shared a photo of the complainant with her new partner. 100 In Sourour, a
male politician posed in a photo with a Black, Muslim woman who had come to
Quebec as a refugee and shared her image without her permission on thousands
of political pamphlets.101 In Awada, a Brown, Muslim woman’s image was used
and her reputation tarnished by a White, male blogger who repeatedly associated
her with violent terrorist groups.102 In another case involving a Muslim woman
(Amin), a male journalist on a day off surreptitiously took a photo in public of
the complainant, who was wearing a niqab, and later used her image in a news
article to discuss the ‘‘culture shock” of seeing her in a small town in Quebec. 103
While other cases involved complainants who were women, the gendered
aspects were complicated by various factors involving the identity of the
defendants at hand. For example, in still another case involving a Muslim
woman (Hammedi) — though this time also involving her children’s images — an
Arab, female blogger took photos of the plaintiff’s children found on a mosque’s
website and reproduced them on her own blog in order to criticize the religious
community’s practices as outdated and anti-feminist.104 In Pia Grillo, the female
complainant made her case against the tech giant Google, claiming rights in the
Google Maps street view image of her in front of her house taken and shared
without her consent, with her face blurred and chest partially showing. 105 In the
case of A c. Corp. Sun Media, the female complainant’s photos were taken and
shared by another female journalist (the defendant) as part of an undercover
infiltration into a community known for being a cult. In that case, however, the
97
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photos were taken at the direction of the defendant’s boss, who wanted a quick
answer and who ‘‘didn’t like journalists that lack enthusiasm,” leaving the
journalist perhaps with little choice but to hesitantly say yes to the task. 106
In other cases, circumstances relating to aspects of the complainant’s identity
add other layers to the gendered aspect of the rights and harms. In the case of
Blanc c. Éditions Bang Bang inc., a trans woman was mocked by a man who
edited a piece of art by superimposing her face on that of a bearded man along
with a title, both of which (her pasted face and the title) seemed to imply that her
true identity was a man, but were ambiguous enough to be interpreted in
multiple ways.107 In Trudeau, the complainant’s actual image was not involved
per se, but she sought an injunction and damages regarding a pornographic film
that used multiple elements to allude to her identity after she gained notoriety for
violent arrests she undertook while working as a police officer in the wake of the
2012 Quebec student protests.108
This small sample indicates that Quebec is no exception to the reality that the
sharing of one’s image without consent is often a matter of gender. More than
this, these cases demonstrate that there are a wide array of circumstances that
complicate any presumption that the women who seek justice and equality in
these cases are uniformly White, come from a particular religious background
(i.e., Judeo-Christian), or are cisgender, among other axes of oppression.
Understanding the intersectional aspects of image rights matters because, as
alluded to earlier, using a person’s image without their consent
disproportionately impacts not only women, but also racialized communities,
religious minorities, LGBTQ2S+ members, and disabled people, 109 and it
frequently involves ‘‘deploying intersecting oppressions such as misogyny,
racism, homophobia, transphobia, classism, ableism, and colonialism.” 110
The misuse and non-consensual sharing of one’s image is an example of a
privacy invasion that operates to control, constrain, and limit expressions of
identity that do not conform to the status quo.111 This activity takes advantage
of structural inequities to perpetuate discriminatory stereotypes and reinforce
106
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systems of oppression such as sexism, homophobia, transphobia, racism,
ableism, classism, and colonialism.112 As depicted in the real-life cases below,
the non-consensual sharing of a person’s image often has the result of shaming
them, drawing unwanted attention to them, silencing them, humiliating them,
and/or perpetuating stereotypical beliefs about them that are harmful and
discriminatory. These are impacts that decision-makers ought to aware of and
attuned to as they advance image rights in Quebec.

(c) Judicial Recognition of Invasions of Privacy in Quebec as Gender-Based
and Intersectional Violence
However, in the cases reviewed, the judges do not consistently recognize the
intersectional and gendered aspects and the possibility of gender-based violence
associated with the image rights claims in Quebec. In only two cases do the
courts explicitly mention the gendered aspect of the nature of the behaviour
involving the complainant and defendant.113 Judges do explicitly acknowledge,
in three cases, the gendered aspect of the case’s facts when it intersects with other
aspects of the complainant’s identity (race/ethnicity, religion, gender identity). 114
In two other cases, a generous reading of judges’ intent allows me to perceive
implicit acknowledgment that gender-based violence is at play.115 In four cases,
the judges made neither explicit nor implicit mentions of gender-based violence
while analyzing the complainant’s right to their image.116 A caveat worth adding
here is the fact that, out of the cases examined, only one involved the use of the
complainant’s sexual image.117 This invariably shaped the judges’ examinations
of the right to one’s image as an individual — as opposed to collective — matter;
the wide variety of circumstances in which a person can claim the right to their
image in Quebec may make it difficult for judges to ascertain the societal issue of
gender-based violence at play in these cases. It is plausible that had the images
been of a sexual nature in the nine other cases examined for this article, that this
would have provoked judges to engage in more analysis of this issue as one of
gendered violence. Put another way, the right to one’s image in Quebec is not
targeting one specific type of activity such as NCDII, making it a challenge to
identify patterns in the communities whose rights are continually at stake.
As mentioned, in only two cases did the judge explicitly acknowledge the
gendered aspects of the violation inflicted on the complainant. While
summarizing the nature of the videos and images shared in Awada, the judge
observed — almost as an aside — that ‘‘the remarks concerning her are clearly
112
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Blanc c. Éditions Bang Bang inc., Awada, Hammedi, supra note 91.
Sourour, Pia Grillo, supra note 91.
Aubry, supra note 10; Trudeau, A c. Corp. Sun Media, Hammedi, supra note 91.
N.G. c. F.B., supra note 91.

ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO ONE’S IMAGE IN QUEBEC

323

sexist and often humiliating.” (35) In N.G. c. F.B., the court could not help but
acknowledge the gender-based violence that can be associated with vengeful
former partners who are men.118 The judge in that case even referenced the
plaintiff’s integrity: ‘‘But above all, he aggravated the situation by attacking the
integrity of the plaintiff and denigrating her to her new spouse in order to break
up their relationship.”119 Out of the ten image rights cases analyzed, these two
cases were the only examples I found in which a judge explicitly acknowledges
the larger, systemic issue of harassment, violence, and abuse that is exacted on
women on a regular basis in Canadian society.
However, several judges did explicitly acknowledge that the complainant’s
identity as a woman, in conjunction with other aspects of her identity, indeed
rendered her more vulnerable to harm. For example, the judge in Blanc c.
Éditions Bang Bang inc. emphasized throughout his decision that the plaintiff was
a trans woman and had experienced great strife throughout her multi-year
transition process. He ended the decision with the following:,
Ms. Blanc is a public figure. Her choice to come to terms with her
transgender status is certainly not an invitation to ridicule her for free
or without justification. Moreover, it does not protect her from
comments, remarks, irony and humor, protected by freedom of
expression, to which all the characters who choose to work in the
public arena are subject, in particular in the field of opinion.120

The court nonetheless framed the plaintiff as a public figure and the edited image
as a caricature, thereby foregoing any in-depth examination of the image’s
impact both on her as an individual and on the trans community as a group that
has an interest in substantive equality.
In the case again of Awada, the judge decided to reproduce a significant chunk of
the submissions by the expert witness, who acknowledged the deeply sexist and
racist remarks that marked the defendant’s posts:
It is necessary to recall the words of the expert Paul Eid which the
Tribunal endorses:
It is in the light of this ideological prism that the idea hammered out like a
leitmotif in the videos takes on its meaning ... according to which Ms.
Awada would embody the emblematic figure of these alienated “midinettes” [derogatory word similar to seamstresses] and instrumentalized by
fundamentalist Islamist movements (note in passing the sexist connotation of the term “midinette” ... to reinforce the idea according to which
118
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veiled women campaigning for the free choice to wear the hijab would be
naive, simple girls, under the influence).
[. . .]
I consider that the analysis of the videos and the publications filed in
evidence reveal several discursive processes — supported by visual
montages — typical of anti-Muslim racism as it is currently expressed in
Quebec, and more generally in the West.121

Is it laudable indeed that the judge reproduced at great length such expertise on
anti-Islam sexism and racism in Quebec, Canada, and the West. Similarly, and
without commentary on the judges’ ultimate decisions, the courts could not help
but explicitly acknowledge the intersections of gender and notions of race in the
cases of Amin and Hammedi given that the facts of the cases also concerned
conceptions of women’s rights when it comes to religious face coverings. 122
In other instances, a generous reading of judges’ decisions to emphasize
certain factual circumstances could be seen as implicitly acknowledging the
gendered dynamics of the case. The court in the case of Sourour, in determining
whether invasion of privacy had occurred, focused primarily on aspects of the
plaintiff’s identity such as her religion and the fact that she was a racialized
former refugee — factors that are implicitly related to her identity as a woman
and to her decision to wear a head covering.123 In essence, the court decided that
the complainant had consented only to having her photo taken, and not to it
being shared.124 The court specifically addressed the plaintiff’s lack of selfdetermination over her religious and ethnic origins due to the image-sharing
activity: ‘‘It is one thing to dress to respect your religion and to be proud of your
origins,” the court opined, ‘‘but it is quite another to allow your image to be used
to promote political ideas.”125
When the plaintiff Pia Grillo made her case against Google, the judge
acknowledged that Pia Grillo was ‘‘greatly disturbed by [the] situation” and
‘‘was the subject of several derogatory comments and mockery at work, in
particular concerning her breasts.”126 The judge also decided to repeat elements
of the letter Pia Grillo says she sent Google:
This puts me, my house, my vehicle and my family members that I live
with at the mercy of potential predators. I feel very vulnerable knowing
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that the information is available to anyone with internet access. The
damage has been done.127

Implicit in these words, from what I observe, is the understanding that
women are particularly vulnerable to harassment such as stalking and violence
that occur near or in their own homes; in this case, it is possible that the judge is
implicitly emphasizing the gendered aspects of such violence.
In other decisions, the court expressed neither explicitly nor implicitly an
understanding of the gendered nature of image rights cases. The court in Trudeau
made no mention of the gender dynamics at play in the plaintiff’s case, most
notably that she was a woman in the male-dominated profession of policing. 128
In the case of A c. Corp. Sun Media, the judge implied that the harm involved was
of a gendered nature when he held that commenting on the female complainant’s
body and the way she dressed (e.g., ‘‘the tall slim blonde with tight clothes”) is a
component of the right to respect for one’s private life.129 The idea that the judge
saw comments on one’s anatomy and manner of dress as an implicitly gendered
matter rests on my assumption that it is a known fact that women’s bodies are
routinely objectified in society, often without regard for their desires.
Further, I observed that courts in Quebec (and elsewhere) may be selective
with regards to who may benefit from particular extensions of the right to one’s
image. In the case of Hammedi, which was decided after A c. Corp. Sun Media,
the court completely ignored the fact that the defendant’s news article was
centred entirely on the way the complainant dressed. A key difference between
Hammedi and Sun Media is that the plaintiff in the former was a religious
minority. It seems the court may selectively apply new components of the right to
respect for one’s private life (e.g., discussions of anatomy or manner of dress) in
ways that may be detrimental to religious minorities in Quebec and Canada. 130
The journalist in Hammedi similarly commented on the plaintiff’s eye
makeup, saying that her eyes behind her niqab were ‘‘surprisingly highlighted, in
a very coquettish or flirtatious way, with an outline of sky-blue eyeshadow.” 131
The defendant — similar to the defendant in A c. Corp. Sun Media — actually
admitted to taking photos of the complainant in a secretive manner so as to
avoid being informed that she did not consent to her image being taken.132 Yet
the court conveniently lumped together its analysis of s 5 (right to one’s private
life) with s 4 (right to honour and reputation) of Quebec’s Charter.133 The judge
127
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ultimately agreed with the defendant that his comments on parts of her anatomy
and manner of dress were not likely to damage the complainant’s honour and
reputation,134 dismissing all bases of her claim despite the factual similarities to A
c. Corp. Sun Media. The court also did not appear to examine in any detail the
cultural dimensions at hand, ignoring the plaintiff’s argument that her honour
was affected because it is forbidden to wear makeup while wearing a niqab. 135 By
sidestepping any analysis of the plaintiff’s honour in this regard and the interests
held by Muslim communities, the court not only demonstrated ignorance of
gender-based violence but also ignored conceptions of harm against religious
minorities, which often intersect with racialized communities in Canada.
In the earlier case of Aubry, the Supreme Court mentioned only in passing
the fact that the complainant was a teenage girl. Again, a very generous reading
of judicial intent allows us to conclude that these mentions constitute an implicit
acknowledgement of the gendered dynamics at play in the case (i.e., when a
strange man takes a photo in a public setting of a teenage girl without her
consent — thereafter reproducing and distributing her image, again without her
consent, and profiting off of that distribution). 136 To the court’s credit, the
majority did not trivialize the harm experienced by the teenage plaintiff when
upholding the assessment of damages, and in fact stated that they, too,
‘‘detect[ed] a violation of dignity” despite the plaintiff describing what could be
seen as ‘‘merely“ being laughed at by people at her school.137 This is important
from legal standpoint; the Supreme Court in Aubry did not incorporate a notion
of the ‘‘reasonable person” in the standard of proof required to assess whether
invasion of privacy had occurred under s 5 of Quebec’s Charter.138 Instead, the
court adopted something more akin to strict liability, holding that a fault (as
understood in the civil law tradition) has occurred as soon as the image is
published without consent and enables the person to be identified
(notwithstanding the existence of exceptions to this rule). Under Aubry, the
plaintiff’s (dare I say subjective) experience of prejudice is only needed to
determine the amount of moral and/or punitive damages, but not necessarily
whether a s 5 violation of Quebec’s Charter has occurred.139 The dignity-based
approach concretized by the court with the case of Aubry also demonstrably
facilitates — and requires — assessment of the complainant’s expectations of
how their image would be used when determining damages. 140
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The above analysis makes clear that — despite the theoretical foundation
that one’s right to one’s image in Quebec is dignity-based — judges still vary in
their consideration of when (and whose) dignity is worth protecting. This is
evidenced by the fact that judges at times acknowledge the gendered nature of the
rights to one’s image in Quebec, but do so (a) seldomly or implicitly, (b) only
when compounded with other notable aspects of the plaintiff’s identity that
render them vulnerable to discrimination, and at times may (c) fail to
acknowledge the need to preserve the collective dignity of women when
assessing the right to one’s image.

(d) Responsibilization and the ‘‘Ideal Victim” of Invasion of Privacy
The courts in the cases I reviewed also incorporated stereotyped
understandings of an ‘‘ideal victim” for such invasion of privacy claims. At
times, it appears that judges have some inkling of understanding of the gendered
aspects of the case before them. In other moments, the courts themselves
perpetuate and exacerbate harmful stereotypes that lay blame on complainants
whom they believe ought to behave in particular ways.141
In Aubry, the judges at both the Supreme Court and provincial appellate
levels did not necessarily undermine the harm experienced by the plaintiff, but
the appeal court put certain biases on display by commenting on her physical
appearance.142 The appeal court observed that the photo in question depicted
‘‘the image of a blonde woman, young, pretty, dressed in pants, a black sweater,
a little thoughtful, her head turned slightly to the left.”143 The court in Awada
made similar remarks about the complainant’s appearance when they described
her as ‘‘a bright, articulate young woman of remarkable beauty and elegantly
wearing a flattering and colorful veil” when she appeared on a popular
Quebecois talk show prior to experiencing the torrent of abuse she faced from the
defendant.144 These seemingly innocuous observations of the plaintiff’s perceived
level of beauty can, indeed, be harmful insofar as they tacitly presume — and
engender — a parallel between complainants deemed worthy of flattery from the
judiciary and the level of protection that they are afforded. (Perhaps not
surprisingly, both of these plaintiffs, deemed attractive, won their cases in court.)
When judges appraise a complainant’s level of attractiveness, it raises concerns
about who is complimented, and about the farther-reaching implications of the
judges’ assessments. Writing about the problem of typecasting of African
American women in US media, Collins, cited in work by Chancer, observed that
a necessary corollary of a ‘‘good” (or in this case attractive) woman is the ‘‘bad”
141
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(or unattractive) women, which rest on — and perpetuate — gendered as well
racial biases.145
Most troublingly, I observed a tendency by the court in N.G. c. F.B. to assign
responsibility to the complainant for the abuse she experienced by her expartner.146 This is significant for critical feminist scholars; this was the only case
that fell in this study’s fairly broad inclusion criteria that dealt with the use of a
sexual image without consent. Throughout the judge’s reasoning, there are
numerous instances of the judge attempting to hold the plaintiff accountable for
the invasion of privacy enacted by her ex-partner. For example, the judge
decided to believe the defendant, who claimed that the complainant sent him
nude photos of herself (versus her claim that he accessed them without her
consent). He stated that his belief was compatible with the complainant’s
behaviour, which he attributed to her ‘‘constant desire to try to seduce men that
she romantically [saw], to offer them photos of herself in ‘sexy’ outfits, while
never really severing emotional ties with them.”147
The judge in N.G. c. F.B. also implied that the plaintiff was unreliable
because he had learned throughout the hearings that she had had multiple
romantic partners at one time: ‘‘Indeed, the plaintiff maintained links with M ...
while she was in a relationship with the defendant and she had an affair with the
latter while she is in a relationship with H ...”148 He did not stop there, writing,
‘‘Her way of being and acting may possibly suit her, but she should not be
surprised that her partners do not share the same vision of things as her.” 149 In
this vein, he later added, ‘‘The fact that the plaintiff herself transmitted the
photos to the defendant possibly demonstrates a certain recklessness on her part,
but their unlawful use almost four years later also confirms a malicious intention
on the part of the defendant who waited for a good time to use it.”150
In short, the judge drew a tenuous connection between the plaintiff’s
previous sexual experiences (that he appeared to understand as promiscuous)
with his perception of the plaintiff’s reliability as a witness, while chastising her
decision to send nude images of herself in the past. By scrutinizing the plaintiff’s
previous sexual relationships in his determination of the defendant’s
responsibility, the judge can be seen as engaging in a spectrum of gendered,
potentially harmful behaviour that lies at the heart of the claim that he is meant
to be adjudicating (women’s right to autonomy and dignity). He also explicitly
states his belief that the plaintiff was being reckless when she sent the sexual
145
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images to the defendant, implying that the behaviour that needs to be corrected is
hers, and not primarily the abusive behaviour that formed the basis of her claim
of invasion of privacy.
By highlighting the gender-based assumptions and stereotypes that have
made their way into Quebec’s case law on the right to one’s image, I hope to
shine a light on important opportunities for learning and growth in the Canadian
legal and judicial community in efforts to ensure substantive equality and
dignity.

4. THE FLEXIBILITY OF PERSONALITY RIGHTS IN QUEBEC
All hope is not lost. My findings suggest that Quebec’s dignity-based
approach for privacy claims is poised to readily capture a broad range of
situations, not just those involving “intimate images, and not just for certain
people (e.g., White, cis, attractive women). For example, consider the few aspects
of identity — or grounds for protection from discrimination — that were present
in the ten cases examined in this article:
.
Aubry — age151
.
Sourour — race/ethnicity, religion, immigration status152
.
Blanc c. Éditions Bang Bang inc. — gender identity153
.
Hammedi — race/ethnicity and religion154
.
Amin — race/ethnicity, religion, and age155
These cases demonstrate that numerous experiences and identities that
currently are not as easily protected in the North American common law’s
narrow conception of NCDII are protected under Quebec’s image-related rights.
Quebec’s broader notion of the right in one’s image is more flexible, pliable, and
ought to develop so as to safeguard dignity and provide substantive equality to a
wider range of communities.
Technological development is also sure to enable new kinds of image-based
abuse online that go beyond the scope of artefacts such as sexual images or static
images. For example, New York State recently extended the right to publicity to
cover synthetic or manipulated media such as deepfakes.156 However, one key
problem with the common law approach is its capacity for ‘‘entrapping”
phenomena in certain rigid logics.157 Publicity rights, an extension of property
151
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rights, can transform the object of protection (i.e., one’s image) into a
commodity and stand in opposition to the right to privacy as an extension of
identity.158 By relying on the liberty-based, rigid, piecemeal approach in common
law to protect one’s self-determination over one’s likeness, this can eschew
approaches (such as Quebec’s right to one’s image) that were crafted to protect
personality rights, privacy, and dignity for both individuals and communities,
often regardless of the kind of image involved.

5. WAYS FORWARD
There are numerous promising institutional initiatives that have emerged in
Canada that seek to help those whose sexual images have been shared without
their consent.159 There is a growing movement advocating for the development in
Canada of a decision-making body or bodies that provide recourse to those
whose images (intimate images in particular) are being shared without their
consent through technological means. 160 Currently, NeedHelpNow.ca, an
initiative of the charity Canadian Centre for Child Protection, provides
information and guidance to young people who ‘‘have been negatively
impacted by a sexual picture/video being shared by peers.”161 Nova Scotia’s
CyberScan Unit also readily provides information to people of any age who have
been the victim of cyberbullying or whose sexual image was shared without their
consent.162 CyberScan’s accessibility and focus on solutions stood out from other
remedial avenues; its staff members can contact the alleged perpetrator of harm
with a view to informally resolving the dispute, all while providing advice,
negotiation, mediation, and ‘‘restorative practices” to the people involved. They
can also help complainants receive protection orders ranging from injunctions to
damages.163
Principles in the common law (including private law) must develop ‘‘in step”
with the values enshrined in the federal Charter rights.164 More research is,
indeed, needed on the possibility, and perhaps growing importance, of the courts’
158
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consideration of fundamental rights when it comes to privacy disputes between
private parties.
In sum, I have canvassed above the current sociolegal landscape in Canada
regarding the non-consensual distribution of images, contrasting the common
law response with Quebec’s system that safeguards positive rights over one’s
image as a subset of one’s private life (which is intimately linked to the notion of
personality rights stemming from continental Europe). Drawing on the ten image
rights cases, this article identifies that, despite the existence of a dignity-based
approach to the adjudication of privacy claims over images, judges in Quebec’s
civil tradition are not consistently or adequately acknowledging the gendered,
societal nature of harms associated with cases involving the right to one’s image.
They are still, at times, perpetuating certain responsibilization narratives or
conceptions of the ‘‘ideal” victim when deciding upon the right to one’s image in
Quebec in the context of sexual images (though many of the cases examined did
not involve nudity or depictions of sexual acts). Nonetheless, the legal concept of
the right to one’s image in Quebec is flexible enough to respond to many types of
complainants and various kinds of images (not just those defined as ‘‘intimate”
or containing nudity or sexuality), holding promise to broaden the scope of
whose dignity can be better safeguarded in Canadian law.
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